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INTRODUCTION 
Though the Great Recession of 2007-2009 has been officially over for several 
years, the United States has been unable to recapture the employment rate that it had 
previously enjoyed. In 2007, before the recession hit, the United States maintained a 
healthy 4.7 percent unemployment rate. It topped off at 9.7 percent in 2010 and only 
now, in 2015, dipped to 5.5 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). In comparison, 
Germany, one of the primary European economic powers, saw a net decline between 
2007 and 2015, going from 7.5 percent to 4.9 percent. Its peak, in 2009, was a mere 7.7 
percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015, Meyerson 2014). Why did the Germany fare 
better in the recession in terms of unemployment than the United States? 
 While the two countries differ in numerous ways, Germany has generally has a 
strong social support system (Mauch and Patel 2010). One of Germany’s main pillars of 
its system is its unemployment insurance, managed by its public employment agency, 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, or BA (Social Protection 2014). While the BA operates an 
unemployment system for laid off workers similar to the American unemployment 
system, it also manages an alternative unemployment system, kurzarbeit. Kurzarbeit, also 
known as short-time compensation or worksharing, is a form of unemployment that 
essentially spreads around unemployment. In this system, employers opt to cut the hours 
of numerous workers rather than lay off a few when business is slow. For example, rather 
than lay off a fifth of their workforce, a company may elect to cut everyone’s hours by 20 
percent.  The government then subsidizes the workers’ loss in income through the 
unemployment system. As a result, using short-time compensation allows companies to 
cut their expenses and governments to subsidize workers at the same rates as full 
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unemployment, but keeps workers employed and engaged. This is generally seen as 
positive in the long run for all parties. Companies who institute short-time compensation 
when profits are low do not have to worry about retraining workers once the market 
returns to normal (Seleznow 2013). The government, who is concerned about 
unemployment, economic output and citizens’ well-being, can keep unemployment low 
and not have to worry as much about business or labor (Cahuc and Carcillo 2011). 
Employees, who keep their jobs, generally have to work less with only a little cut in pay, 
but are not as at risk for health issues as they would be if unemployed nor do they have to 
worry about the stress of finding a new job (Seleznow 2013). 
 Short-time compensation is gaining ground in the United States. As of November 
2014 and Oklahoma’s repeal of its law, 28 states have short-time compensation laws 
(Seleznow 2013). Through the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 
the United States federal government has essentially endorsed short-time compensation 
by providing financing to states that implement short-time compensation programs and 
promoting them. By providing states with short-time compensation funding, it also set up 
guidelines for these programs, one of which is monthly reporting on the status of short-
time compensation from each state. As a result of the recession and this legislation, the 
number of short-time compensation states has grown from 17 in 2009, to 23 in 2012 to 28 
in 2014 (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Ridley and Wentworth 2012, Seleznow 2013). 
 While short-time compensation has been implemented in numerous other 
industrialized countries, the American reforms can only be successful if they account for 
the unique perspectives that Americans have about work and welfare. So far, American 
short-time compensation systems primarily benefit state governments and, to a lesser 
  3 
extent, employers (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Vroman 2013). If these systems are 
not constructed in a way that encourages worker participation, it will be difficult for 
workers and unions to consent to such a new and unique system. Given these challenges, 
it is critical to understand what the workers themselves think about short-time 
compensation and what factors may make such a program acceptable to them. 
This thesis gathered survey data to investigate American willingness to participate 
in such a program and what attributes found in other countries’ programs they find 
palatable. Because multiple workers in similar states were surveyed online, the data show 
what various workers need from a short-time compensation program. These data could be 
used to construct unique and effective policies that best fit the needs of American 
workers, both in states that have not yet implemented short-time compensation and those 
that have. 
 The material for this survey was generated from some other countries’ 
implementations of short-time compensation. Short-time compensation is found in 
numerous industrialized countries besides Germany. For example, France, Belgium and 
Italy all have short-time compensation programs (Abraham and Houseman 2013). 
Countries heavily influenced by British culture (namely Ireland, Canada and the United 
Kingdom) instituted a similar program as well (Abraham and Houseman 2013, 
Calavrezo, Duhautois and Walkowiak 2010). Even former Communist Bloc countries, 
the Czech Republic and Austria, operate some kind of short-time compensation system 
(Abraham and Houseman 2013). While the program is generally successful throughout 
OECD countries, the United States lacks a national short-time compensation system.  
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Though short-time compensation is more commonly found in countries that are 
considered more economically liberal than the United States, its implementation varies 
widely among the states, often independent of political ideology (Abraham and 
Houseman 2013). For example, Rhode Island, a blue state, is one of the largest 
proponents of short-time compensation, an idea first implemented in the United States in 
California, another generally liberal state. Texas, a red state, also has short-time 
compensation, as does the generally conservative Alaska. Meanwhile, Illinois and 
Delaware, two of the more liberal states have not implemented this type of 
unemployment. Indiana and Utah, two very conservative states, have not either. 
Short-time compensation is quickly becoming a hot issue. It has been researched 
by a variety of organizations, some of which have received grants for their research from 
organizations such as the Ford Foundation. However, this research has generally focused 
on how short-time compensation affects businesses and governments (Abraham and 
Houseman 2013, Vroman and Brusentsev 2009, Vroman 2013). Little has been done in 
regard to the workers’ opinions of this unemployment system. Most of the research on 
workers has been done in other countries (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Cahuc and 
Carcillo 2011, Calavrezo, Duhautois and Walkowiak 2010, Reid 1982, Social Protection 
2014, Vroman and Brusentsev 2009, Vroman 2013). Because American workers are less 
likely to belong to a union or are more likely to look at their situation from an inherently 
independent standpoint (Gao 2015), previous research will not be particularly useful in 
crafting work-sharing policies that are supported and utilized by both American 
businesses and American workers. 
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Effects of Unemployment on American Workers 
Since short-time compensation is a method by which governments and businesses 
can reduce unemployment, it is important to first understand the role that unemployment 
has in the public sphere.  Since the early 1990s, employers have been using permanent 
layoffs to reduce staffing levels, as opposed to temporary layoffs. Had employers used 
temporary layoffs during the late-2000s recession at the same rate as they had in the 
recessions of 1970, 1974, 1980 and 1982, 1.34 million more people would have been 
temporarily laid off in 2010, while 1.43 million fewer people would have found 
themselves permanently laid off (Vroman 2013). 
 As a whole, unemployment affects workers in several, generally negative ways. 
Unemployed workers face difficulty in finding reemployment, encountering frequent and 
prolonged periods of unemployment. They are also more likely to face serious health 
risks. Displaced older, male workers are more likely to die in the years following a job 
loss than workers who do not lose their jobs (Sullivan and Von Wachter 2009). Many of 
these deaths are from suicide. Classen and Dunn (2012) found that the suicide rate for 
males increased by 1.5 percent for every 10 percent increase in the unemployment rate. 
While that may seem like a relatively small increase in the suicide rate, their research 
shows that unemployment is the most important force in the relationship between the risk 
of suicide and the lack of a job (Hassett and Strain 2014). An increase in similar health 
illnesses and issues have been linked with joblessness, specifically cancer, heart attacks 
and psychiatric problems (Hassett and Strain 2014). This is further compounded by the 
fact that the unemployed are likely to lose health insurance (Vroman 2013). 
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 Unemployment can also cause negative non-health related social outcomes. For 
example, unemployment can cause workers to retire earlier (Vroman 2013), but can also 
increase the possibility of divorce following a husband or wife’s job loss. Another 
negative outcome is that  children of fathers who have lost of job tend to have 10 percent 
lower earnings as adults (Hassett and Strain 2014). 
 Worse yet, the unemployed have difficulty finding new employment. Employers 
tend not to hire those who have been unemployed long term more than six months. Firms 
often do not interview the long-term unemployed. The length of unemployment also 
causes skills and professional networks to decay (Hassett and Strain 2014). This is 
partially because most people who lose their jobs expect to be rehired by the same 
employer who laid them off. A survey showed that at least 75 percent of laid off 
manufacturing workers are rehired by their previous employer (Feldstein 1976). While 
this generally happens during times of layoffs, the recent recession has been unusually 
harsh for workers, prompting employers to forego rehiring those they laid off for savings. 
 These problems are further exacerbated by the United States’ actions towards the 
length of unemployment insurance. Following the advent of the crisis, the U.S. 
government extended unemployment benefits from 26 weeks to 99 weeks as a means to 
help those who lost their jobs to transition back into a growing economy. However, 
research shows that an increase in one week of potential unemployment benefits caused 
unemployment to last an additional fifth of a week (Katz and Meyer 1990), and lead to a 
slight increase in unemployment of no more than .5 percentage points (Rothstein 2011). 
As a result, an increase in unemployment benefits is indirectly correlated with many 
negative outcomes for the unemployed. However, proponents of expanded benefits 
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counter that this is not truly a negative outcome. Marston et al. (1975) cite that workers 
that receive benefits may stay unemployed longer than they normally would because 
benefits may allow them to be more selective about jobs they will accept. 
Simultaneously, workers will also have longer to decide if they want to withdraw from 
the workforce entirely (or decide earlier but continue to draw benefits). 
 The existence of unemployment benefits also gives employers some relief too. 
Research has shown that the American unemployment insurance system subsidizes 
layoffs (Abraham and Houseman 2013). Employers rely on layoffs as opposed to other 
methods of wage control (such as worksharing, whether subsidized with short-time 
compensation or not). While it is true that employers repay states’ unemployment 
insurance fund through UI taxes, these payments are often spread out over many years 
and are interest free. Furthermore, because there are maximum and minimum limits, 
companies can layoff additional workers without taking on too much of a financial 
penalty. Because the United States has very weak employment protection laws, 
employers generally have an easier time terminating employment, unlike in other 
countries with stronger laws. Layoffs may also be easier and less cumbersome for 
companies that wish to implement wage controls than other methods like work sharing. 
Workers in states that do not have short-time compensation are unwilling to utilize 
furloughs or other work-sharing methods because they do not receive any funding for 
their sacrifices (Abraham and Houseman 2013). Furthermore, collective-bargaining 
agreements often have clauses that require firms to lay off workers before cutting hours 
(Feldstein 1976). Therefore, workers are more likely to desire layoffs while businesses 
see more financial advantages to layoffs than to other wage control methods. Some, such 
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as Feldstein (1976), argue that the U.S. unemployment compensation system has done 
more to increase unemployment than to decrease it. 
 
Short-Time Compensation Systems in Other Countries 
 While many of these issues and attributes are found in unemployment 
compensation systems throughout the world, they are not as severe in many systems. This 
is partially due to other countries’ use of short-time compensation systems. Of 30 OECD 
member countries, 24 offered short-time compensation programs during 2010. These 
countries included the aforementioned Germany and Czech Republic, Canada, Finland, 
Japan, and Mexico, indicating that short-time compensation is found in a number of 
cultures with differing economic histories (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Vroman and 
Brusentsev 2009, Vroman 2013). Provisions of the programs varied between the 
countries, but almost all of them made some adjustments to their systems in the midst of 
the Great Recession. These modifications include lengthening the potential duration of 
plans (to 52 weeks in Canada and 24 months in Germany) or providing funding for 
training, as in Hungary and the Czech Republic (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009). 
 Many of these changes are associated with greater short-time compensation 
usage. For example, Vroman and Brusentsev (2009) report several features of short-time 
compensation systems that lead to greater usage. All of these features can be seen as 
worker-centric, focusing mostly on payments to workers and flexibility in hours. 
However, one of the primary features associated with higher usage is worker training, 
likely because replacing work hours with training allows both workers and employers to 
feel as though they still have a full shift even when hours have been reduced. 
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 In Germany, short-time compensation use helped increase employment by an 
estimated 250,000 to 400,000 workers in 2009 by having 1.14 million workers participate 
in the program (Vroman 2013). However, this employment increase may be short lived, 
as evidence from Canada’s program shows that half of short-time compensation 
participants are unemployed within six months of the completion of a short-time 
compensation plan. Furthermore, their duration on unemployment compensation is the 
same as those who were initially laid off (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009). 
Short-time compensation has had some success during previous major economic 
crises. Germany, for instance, began the program in West Germany in the 1950s 
(although remnants of it date back to the 1920s). Following the German reunification in 
the early-1990s, a special and more generous form of short-time compensation was used 
in the Eastern German states until the West German program replaced it in 1992. Though 
is had several million participating in the program in East Germany in the early 1990s, 
monthly use averaged less than 100,000 between 1994 and the onset of the recession 
(Abraham and Houseman 2013, Vroman and Brusentsev 2009). The German system, like 
most short-time compensation systems, is generally flexible, allowing minute changes 
between a company and a union or works council without governmental approval. 
Similarly, the system is designed to be efficient. For example, in Germany, workers do 
not have to apply for separate unemployment compensation; the unemployment 
compensation in the German system is provided directly to German companies and paid 
as a part of a regular paycheck. 
However, Germany is a less-than-ideal country to look to for short-time 
compensation guidance for the United States. Germany has stronger workplace 
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protections for employees, a stronger social safety net (especially in terms of social 
insurance for retired workers and health insurance), and more robust unions that have 
greater access to the inner-workings of a company through the use of a works council. 
Rather, for short-time compensation guidance, it would be better to compare the United 
States to Canada. Though Canada shares some attributes of a strong social safety net with 
Germany, it is closer culturally with the United States. Canada’s short-time compensation 
was founded and trialed in the late 1970s-early 1980s, prior to the institution of some 
social welfare reforms (notably, Canada’s single payer health insurance system). Reid 
(1982) looked at the trial run and how it affected those participating. He reported that 
business groups generally found short-time compensation to be helpful because they had 
a net reduction in operating costs. The government also approved of the system because it 
reduced unemployment and spread the effects of a downturn in production to many 
employees. It did increase unemployment insurance costs, but only because of the special 
and generous conditions to promote the trial run. In a non-trial environment, the costs of 
operating the program would not be much more than normal unemployment, but would 
decrease unemployment by 1 to 2 percent. Most importantly to this research, workers 
generally approved of the trial run, since they often worked one less day per week but 
only sacrificed 5 percent of post-tax earnings, indicating that employees preferred short-
time compensation to full unemployment. Employees also had the ability to maintain 
contact with their workgroup and avoid the aforementioned social problems associated 
with job loss. 
During this experiment, though, national unions (such as the Canadian Labor 
Congress) opposed the short-time system while local unions approved it. The CLC 
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worried about the long-term effects of such a system, mostly because they feared it would 
detract and weaken ongoing labor battles with the Canadian government. As a result, they 
referred to it as “poverty-sharing” and violations of the seniority principle (Reid 1982). 
 
Short-Time Compensation in the United States 
Conversely, the AFL-CIO was supportive of short-time compensation in the 
United States at that time. Following the Canadian trial, California became the first state 
to implement short-time compensation (Reid 1982). Over the next thirty years, almost 30 
states passed similar legislation (although, the legislation was rolled back in several, 
notably Illinois and Oklahoma). Until 2012, states that had short-time compensation laws 
were found to have two statistically-significant factors: liberal leanings and Motorola 
factories. In the 1980s, Motorola implemented a “no layoffs” policy and heavily lobbied 
for states to set up these systems (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009, Vroman 2013). The fact 
that Illinois deviated from expectations and rolled back its short-time compensation law 
is interesting, considering its general liberal-leanings and the fact that Motorola was 
founded and headquartered in the Chicago suburbs. Presumably, Motorola was more 
interested in short-time compensation for its manufacturing plants, since this type of 
unemployment insurance is most often found in the manufacturing sector. 
Of the nearly-30 states that have short-time compensation, Rhode Island stands 
out as the best example of an American success story. Rhode Island is the only state to 
consistently have at least 1 percent of its Unemployment Insurance payments to be from 
short-time compensation use. By 2009, though, many other states had rates above 1 
percent while Rhode Island’s short-time compensation payments climbed to 4 percent of 
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unemployment (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Vroman and Brusentsev 2009). While not 
comparable to the likes of Germany and other heavy short-time compensation use 
countries, Rhode Island’s rate is comparable to some European countries that have this 
type of system, notably France and the Netherlands (Abraham and Houseman 2013). 
Rhode Island argues that its use of short-time compensation saved the state nearly 14,000 
jobs, preventing its already highest-in-the-nation unemployment rate from skyrocketing 
even more beyond 9.1 percent during the recession (Prah 2014). 
Rhode Island’s short-time compensation success is the result of intense 
advertisement from the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, the department 
that oversees short-time compensation. They advertise short-time compensation through 
their website and other employer materials and highlight the successful stories of 
companies that have used it. When they learn of an employer who is looking to layoff 
employees, they intervene and promote short-time compensation to both the employer 
and its workers as an option for these companies (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Vroman 
2013). 
Rhode Island’s success and dedication to short-time compensation has also spread 
to federal legislation. Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island pushed for federal legislation 
for short-time compensation in both 2010 and 2011. Many of his provisions were 
included in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of February 2012. 
Specifically, the law provided funding for short-time compensation, federal 
responsibilities for promoting it, and federal standards for state programs that received 
federal money (Vroman 2013). As a result, the legislation gave federal approval to these 
types of programs and encouraged them to be a little bit more in line with other countries’ 
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unemployment programs, which are run at the national level, not the state or provincial 
level as they are in the U.S. 
However, there are still some barriers to their widespread use in the United States. 
One of the obvious obstacles to widespread short-time compensation use is the fact that it 
is not legal in every state. Though federal financing has enticed several states to pass 
short-time compensation laws, some states still face roadblocks and others are repealing 
their laws (Wentworth, McKenna and Minick 2014). Similarly, American short-time 
compensation programs are often not enticing to employers or employees.  
Americans are more averse to social welfare programs than people of other 
countries. As short-time compensation is currently organized in the United States, those 
who had their hours reduced as part of a short-time compensation agreement would have 
to apply for unemployment separately. The extra step of doing so, plus the stigma 
attached with it, may inhibit some Americans from doing so. Vroman and Brusentsev 
(2009) report that countries that direct the short-time compensation payments through 
employers have a higher use of short-time compensation. Simultaneously, American 
workers may be apprehensive about short-time compensation because it may limit their 
unemployment compensation if they were to lose their jobs. Though a worker on short-
time compensation would use their unemployment benefits at a slower rate than those 
who are fully unemployed (calculated on the full time equivalency of the time they are 
shorted), they may still fear that their employer will not be able to retain them at the end 
of the short-time compensation period and the short-time compensation would possibly 
cut several weeks worth of unemployment. Similarly, Vroman and Brusentsev argue that 
short-time compensation is used more in countries (like Canada and most European 
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countries) that separate short-time compensation from regular unemployment 
compensation. 
Simultaneously, Abraham and Houseman (2013) report that senior employees 
may be less willing to support short-time compensation because they are less likely to be 
affected by layoffs. Short-time compensation was used in the 1930s, but fell out of favor 
for the union-negotiated seniority system, which has persisted to this day. In fact, 78 
percent of union hourly groups were covered by written policies specifying seniority to 
be the primary factor in determining layoffs. In 74 percent of collective bargaining 
contracts, seniority solely determined who was laid off. Studies show that the seniority 
principle is entrenched with both union and nonunion groups, who both say that junior 
employees should be let go before senior employees (Abraham and Medoff 1984). 
However, because of the seniority system, employers may be more willing to support 
short-time compensation since they can save more money by cutting the hours of all 
workers (including the most senior and highest paid employees) than by cutting the jobs 
of the least-senior and least-paid employees. 
Furthermore, any use of short-time compensation counts against an employers 
unemployment experience rating in the United States. As a result, the effect of short-time 
compensation may affect their unemployment taxes the same as normal unemployment. 
Previously, states instituted short-time compensation taxes to fund this program, but 
discontinued them after discovering that short-time compensation costs were low 
(Vroman and Brusentsev 2009). Employers may also hesitate to use short-time 
compensation because they cannot remove benefits from workers in a short-time 
compensation contract. This is not a fundamentally large issue for benefits that scale 
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(such as matching a percentage of income in a pension fund), but is problematic for flat 
costs, such as health insurance. By laying off workers, employers can remove all benefit 
costs. Employers may be unwilling to support short-time compensation because cutting 
everyone’s hours could cause the most productive and skilled workers to seek 
employment elsewhere. With layoffs, employers can choose who to keep and who to 
drop. Employers may also just lay off workers to avoid the paperwork of a short-time 
compensation agreement (Abraham and Houseman 2013). Finally, firms may layoff 
workers to better organize their companies, focusing on their strengths and shedding their 
weaknesses. By instituting a short-time compensation strategy, they may not be able to 
increase their efficiency as easily (Hassett and Strain 2014). 
Ultimately, unemployment has many concerning effects on workers that short-
time compensation has been able to fix in other countries. Short-time compensation is 
available in the U.S., but only to about 70 percent of the population (with Illinois and 
North Carolina, two very populous states, being outliers that do not offer this form of 
unemployment insurance) (U.S. Census Bureau 2014, Wentworth, McKenna and Minick 
2014). Even then, usage is far lower than in comparable industrialized countries. Though 
the U.S. federal government is pushing for short-time compensation by offering financial 
incentives, and states are implementing it, there is no guarantee that these programs will 
be used or even be successful in the U.S. The success of this form of unemployment may 
depend on the willingness of workers to participate in it. 
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SPECIFIC AIMS 
 Because short-time compensation is a relatively new and underused phenomenon 
in the American labor market, a study of workers would have to include elements of 
deductive and inductive research. Thus, this research is based on a series of research 
questions. 
1) How comfortable would Americans be accepting short-time compensation 
benefits?  
a. What kind of reduction in hours would be most palatable to them? 
b. Would workers seek out other employment opportunities if they faced 
a reduction in hours? 
2) How would American workers views on short-time compensation change if 
certain elements of other countries’ systems were part of the equation? 
a. Would they feel more supportive of short-time compensation if 
governments and employers offered training in lieu of a day off? 
b. Would they be more supportive of it to if it did not cut into their 
regular unemployment benefits? 
3) How comfortable would American workers be applying for unemployment 
insurance if they were on short-time compensation? 
a. Would they feel more comfortable if unemployment payments were 
routed through their employers? 
4) Does seniority affect the views of short-time compensation? 
a. Would senior employees prefer layoffs instead? 
b. Does union membership affect views? 
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5) How do views of short-time compensation differ between industries? 
a. Would lower-class workers favor short-time compensation at higher 
levels than upper-class workers? 
b. Would upper-class workers want to use it at all? 
6) How do views of short-time compensation change depending on political 
ideology? 
a. Is there any difference in support from conservatives and liberals? 
b. Will each group support different potential aspects in a short-time 
compensation system? 
c. Does a state’s political climate and ideological leanings affect how 
people feel about short-time compensation?  
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The primary difficulty with this project is reaching out to workers across state 
lines. Because short-time compensation and many other labor laws are implemented at 
the state level, workers from different states have vastly different experiences that might 
change their perspectives on short-time compensation. For example, Indiana and Illinois 
have differing laws on labor union organization by nature of their possession and lack of 
a right-to-work law, respectively. Because Illinois workers have a slightly easier time 
unionizing and staying unionized than Indiana workers, they may feel differently about 
short-time compensation and whether they would be willing to participate in it or 
unionize and have a collective bargaining team find an alternative. Thus, to create 
research flexible enough to be used in any given state for the implementation of short-
time compensation, this research should not be limited to just one state. 
 This issue inhibits the research process. Resources are not easily available to talk 
to workers in multiple states. In-person interviews would be unfeasible for financial 
reasons. Telephone conversations could be used, but workers may be unwilling to talk on 
the phone for an extended period of time. Telephone conversations run into issues of 
response rate, where response rate drops an average of 7 percent for every ten minutes on 
the phone (McCarty et al. 2006). Similarly, telephone conversations would exhaust time, 
money and other resources. 
 Thus, the data for this study were collected through the use of an online survey. 
The researcher developed the study within the Qualtrics survey platform and posted it on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. Admittedly, one could argue that an 
online survey caters to certain demographics and that the digital divide limits access from 
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certain types of people, notably minorities and the working class. However, Buhrmester, 
Kwang and Gosling’s (2011) research shows that MTurk tends to generate samples with 
at least a third non-white participants and a mean age of approximately 33 years. As a 
result, it is likely to capture a number of workers who have relatively low-to-mid 
seniority that would be likely candidates for layoffs. 
 The survey was uploaded to Amazon’s MTurk service and open to participants 
between April 23, 2015 and May 24, 2015. During the first two weeks, participants were 
rewarded 40 cents for completing the survey. During this time, the response rate was very 
low, so the compensation amount was increased to $1 for the rest of the survey. 
 Respondents who selected the survey were taken to the survey in Qualtrics 
(chosen because the IU data stewards have approved Qualtrics for HIPAA and FERPA 
data collection (Bryner 2014) and asked to agree to an informed consent page. After 
doing so, they were asked several questions to gauge eligibility, including their unique 
MTurk ID number. This was to ensure that no participant would try to “brute-force” their 
way into the survey by trying eligibility combinations until they entered on that would 
grant them access. As a result, the researcher was able to ensure that no worker tried to 
attempt the survey more than once. Those that did try and were successful had their 
responses rejected and their final results filtered out of the final sample. Altogether, 4,261 
ineligible attempts were made to complete the survey. 
 To ensure that respondents took the questions seriously and did not randomly 
click answers, a control question (or attention check) was placed approximately two-
thirds through the survey. Most participants who completed the survey completed the 
attention check correctly. As Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling (2011) show, many MTurk 
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participants do not complete surveys for the money, but because they enjoy taking 
surveys. Those who did not answer this question correctly were rejected and their final 
results filtered out of the final sample. 
 At the completion of the survey, participants were given a four-digit completion 
code to enter into the Amazon MTurk system to be compensated for their time. Upon 
doing that, Amazon notified the researcher of a completion. The researcher then checked 
the Mturk number and the four-digit completion to ensure a match and double-checked 
the eligibility responses were within the sampling frame, that the MTurk ID number had 
not been entered into a previous response and that the quality control question was 
correctly answered. 
 Following the completion of the data collection, the researcher completed this 
checking process a second time and divided the eligible and completed data from the 
ineligible data. 
 The survey was constructed using topics and issues common throughout the 
literature on short-time compensation. Questions were generally original to the survey. 
Responses were generally ordinal in nature, based on a five-point Likert scale.  Several 
questions, such as one asking the maximum number hours a respondent would allow to 
be reduced, were ratio variables. The demographic questions were structured from 
standardized questions provided by SurveyMonkey and were generally nominal or 
ordinal in nature. Respondents also had the option to answer “Don’t Know” or “Prefer 
Not to Say” on most questions. Exceptions were eligibility questions and some 
demographic questions where participants were expected to know the answer, such as 
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gender (although they were allowed to respond “Prefer Not to Say”). The questionnaire, 
as it appeared in Qualtrics, is available in the Appendix. 
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SAMPLE 
To be eligible for this survey, respondents had to be a full-time employee 
(working approximately 40 hours per week in one job) in the Midwestern states of 
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Michigan. Full-time employees were sampled because they are 
the focus of short-time compensation. 
 This project is focusing on workers in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio 
primarily because these four states, being Midwestern Great Lakes states, have similar 
economies. Illinois and Indiana have not implemented short-time compensation, while 
Michigan and Ohio have. Illinois and Michigan tend to be liberal leaning, while Indiana 
and Ohio tend to lean conservative. Each state has at least one major city or metropolitan 
area, but is still fairly rural. As a result, these states have similar economies and face 
similar issues, making them ideal candidates for comparison. 
 The original parameters in MTurk simply required that a respondent had at least a 
95 percent approval rating on previous MTurk tasks. This, however, resulted in many 
responses coming from IP addresses located on the Indian subcontintent. While some 
responses could have come from that area of the world due to travelling workers and the 
use of IP address-masking techniques (such as a Virtual Private Network or VPN), the 
proportion of responses coming from India to those originating in the United States was 
too high. The researcher took that survey down and added a MTurk parameter requiring 
respondents to live within the United States or Canada (assuming that some Canadians 
worked in Michigan and would be eligible for the survey). The researcher used two 
responses in that initial survey that came from US-based IP addresses. 
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 The sample ultimately resulted in 298 completed surveys. This is more than the 
241 responses required for a power analysis at the .05 level using six predictor variables, 
a power of 85 percent and an effect size of .065, between the small effect size of .02 and 
the medium effect size of .15. 
 Respondents hailed from each state. Table 1 shows the distribution of 
respondents. Ohio had the largest number of respondents, followed by Illinois, Michigan 
and then Indiana. In terms of population, Illinois has the highest, followed by Ohio, 
Michigan and then Indiana. As a result, the sample is slightly biased towards Ohio.  
Table 1: State Distribution of Respondents 
State Frequency Percent 
Illinois 75 25.2 
Indiana 53 17.8 
Michigan 71 23.8 
Ohio 99 33.2 




  24 
ANALYSIS 
 After data collection was complete, the data were entered into SPSS and cleaned 
up. A series of frequencies, crosstabs, regressions and ANOVAs were conducted on the 
data to generate the results.  
 When frequency tests and crosstabs were conducted, general descriptive statistics 
were also calculated, including percentages, means, medians and modes. These tests 
showed the respondents’ general opinions about short time compensation and various 
elements that could be added to the system. 
 Regressions were used to show the relationships between two variables. Most of 
the regressions completed were simple regressions, although a multiple regression was 
done to show which variables have the largest influence on the overall acceptance of 
short-time compensation. 
 Finally, an ANOVA was completed to show how political ideology affects 
opinions of short-time compensation when income and education are involved. A second 
ANOVA was completed in order to show the difference in support within each political 
ideology in each state. This is necessary because a conservative in a traditionally liberal 
state like Illinois will likely be comparable to a moderate in a traditionally conservative 
state like Indiana. 
Several variables were recoded during this process. A survey question that asked 
how many hours of short-time compensation would be acceptable to respondents was 
recoded to be an ordinal variable, while a question that asked respondents to list the 
industry they worked was recoded to consolidate options with less than five responses 
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into a general other category. This recoding allowed for better organization and more 
clarity of the results. 
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RESULTS 
Specific Aim 1 and Sub-aims 1a and 1b 
How comfortable would Americans be accepting short-time compensation 
benefits? What kind of reduction in hours would be most palatable to them? Would 
workers seek out other employment opportunities if they faced a reduction in hours? 
 Table 2 reports these findings. Nearly half, 46.6 percent of respondents, would be 
very comfortable accepting short-time compensation benefits. Furthermore, another 29.8 
percent would be comfortable. Ultimately, this means that approximately 76 percent of 
respondents would be comfortable accepting short-time compensation benefits. 
Conversely, only 14.7 percent would be uncomfortable or very uncomfortable accepting 
these benefits.  
 However, while they may be comfortable using short-time compensation, these 
data do not show the specifics of their comfort. While they may be comfortable with the 
general idea of short-time compensation, they may feel differently when faced with it in 
their work lives. Thus, they were asked to identify the exact number of reduced hours 
they would feel uncomfortable with the short-time compensation agreement. The data 
they provided was recoded into ordinal ranges for clarity purposes (See Table 3). 
Table 2: Comfort of Acceptance 
Response Frequency Percent 
Very Uncomfortable 14 4.8 
Uncomfortable 29 9.9 
Neither Uncomfortable nor Comfortable 26 8.9 
Comfortable 87 29.8 
Very Comfortable 136 46.6 
Total 290 100 
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 Table 3 reports that approximately a third of Midwestern workers would be most 
comfortable with a reduction of between 11 and 20 percent of their hours. Another 23.4 
percent would be comfortable with a reduction of more than 0 percent but less than 10 
percent of their hours. Notably, 12.9 percent of workers indicated that they would be 
uncomfortable with any reduction in their hours. 
 While workers appear to be comfortable with some short-time compensation, they 
may still doubt the long-term viability of their employer and may look for alternative 
employment. To track this, the researcher asked participants of their likelihood in 
searching for both a part-time and full-time job. The data were then organized into a 
crosstab (Table 4) to show the likelihood of a respondent looking for either.  
Table 3: Maximum Hours Reduced 
Response Frequency Percent 
0 (I would feel uncomfortable with any reduction) 37 12.9 
Between 0 and 10 percent of hours 67 23.4 
Between 11 and 20 percent of hours 100 35.0 
Between 21 and 30 percent of hours 41 14.3 
Between 31 and 40 percent of hours 23 8.0 
Between 41 and 50 percent of hours 18 6.3 
Total 286 100 
 
 Respondents generally noted that they would be either likely or very likely to look 
for a part-time job or a new full-time job. Approximately 16 percent of respondents said 
they would be very likely to look for both. Meanwhile, approximately 10 percent said 
they were very likely to look for a full-time job, but only likely to look for a part-time 
job. Approximately 11 percent said they would be very likely to look for a part-time job 
and likely to look for a full-time job. Nearly 14 percent said they would be likely to do so 
on both measure. Combined, 50.9 percent said that they were either likely or very likely 
to look for a full-time and part-time job. 
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Very Unlikely 2.5% 0.7% 0.4% 0.7% 1.4% 5.8% 
Unlikely 1.8% 3.3% 2.9% 5.8% 0.7% 14.4% 
Neither Unlikely 
nor Likely 
0.7% 3.3% 4.0% 1.8% 1.8% 11.6% 
Likely 0.4% 6.9% 5.4% 14.1% 10.1% 36.8% 
Very Likely 0.4% 1.8% 2.5% 10.8% 15.9% 31.4% 
Total 5.8% 15.9% 15.2% 33.2% 30.0% 100.0% 
 
 Conversely, only 8.3 percent said that they were very unlikely or unlikely to look 
for a part-time and a full-time job. On each metric individually, less than a fifth of 
respondents were unlikely or very unlikely to look for a part-time job and slightly more 
than a fifth were unlikely or very unlikely to look for a full-time job.  
 
Specific Aim 2 and Sub-aims 2a and 2b 
How would American workers views on short-time compensation change if 
certain elements of other countries’ systems were part of the equation? Would they feel  
more supportive of short-time compensation if governments and employers offered 
training in lieu of a day off? Would they be more supportive of it to if it did not cut into 
their regular unemployment benefits? 
Because other short-time compensation systems have various elements that affect 
workers, and those elements have contributed to and detracted from their success, 
respondents were asked if they would be more or less accepting of short-time 
compensation if these various elements were included. These responses were analyzed as 
frequencies in SPSS and the mean and medians were calculated (See Table 5). 
  29 
Generally, these elements did not significantly affect opinions of short-time 
compensation. Table 5 show the means of all of them ranged between 3 and 4, meaning 
that respondents leaned to be more accepting of the system with these elements, but not 
by much. The most influential items were the proposals that the government pay short-
time benefits directly to workers (Mean 3.74), that workers or a union must agree to 
participate in a short-time compensation program (Mean 3.72) and that employers file for 
short-time benefits for their employees (Mean 3.65). Conversely, the least influential item 
was the proposal that workers apply for their benefits individually, getting a mean of 
3.04. Notably, all elements had approximately 50 percent or more of respondents say that 
they would be more accepting or far more accepting of these elements, except for the 
suggestion that workers apply for benefits individually (which had a combined more 
accepting value of only 34.7 percent). 
However, Table 5 also shows the relationship of training programs and short-time 
compensation for sub-aim 2a. The data show that workers would be more accepting of 
short-time compensation if they had the option to participate in training programs, with 
over 78 percent of respondents favoring the option with a mean of 4.14. However, they 
would oppose mandatory participation in a training program, with only about 26 percent 
of respondents being more accepting of the program with that requirement (Mean 2.70). 
For the second sub-aim of the question, 2b, workers were asked if they would be 
more accepting of short-time compensation benefits if those benefits did not count 
against future unemployment benefits. This element of short-time compensations was the 
most popular, with 57.34 percent of respondents answering far more accepting and 
  30 
another 26.92 percent answering more accepting (for a combined more accepting total of 
84.26 percent, Mean 4.34). 
















collectively agree to short-
time compensation program 
3.9% 8.5% 24.2% 38.1% 25.3% 281 3.72 
STC-using companies must 
pay more in unemployment 
insurance premiums 
4.0% 14.4% 31.4% 31.4% 18.8% 277 3.47 
STC benefits are paid to 
employer, who pays them 
to workers through regular 
paychecks 
6.0% 14.0% 27.0% 35.8% 17.2% 285 3.44 
Employers file for 
employees' STC benefits 
5.6% 12.5% 19.8% 35.8% 26.4% 288 3.65 
Workers apply for STC 
benefits individually 
8.6% 28.2% 28.5% 19.6% 15.1% 291 3.04 
The government pays STC 
benefits directly to workers 
3.8% 9.8% 26.8% 27.9% 31.7% 287 3.74 
Workers have the option to 
participate in training 
programs 
1.1% 1.1% 18.5% 41.6% 37.8% 286 4.14 
Workers must participate in 
training programs in lieu of 
reduced hours 
19.2% 29.7% 25.5% 12.9% 12.6% 286 2.7 
Unemployment benefits 
used through STC do not 
count against future full-
time unemployment 
insurance benefits 
2.8% 2.8% 9.8% 26.9% 57.3% 285 4.34 
 
Specific Aim 3 and Sub-aim 3a 
How comfortable would American workers be applying for unemployment 
insurance if they were on short-time compensation? Would they feel more comfortable if 
unemployment payments were routed through their employers? 
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 While the previous specific aims show that Americans would be comfortable with 
the system and various aspects of it, this one shows how comfortable workers would be 
actually acting in the system by applying. To do this, workers were asked how 
comfortable they would be applying for short-time compensation and analyzed the results 
using frequencies (See Table 6). 
 Table 6 shows the majority of people, 52.8 percent, said they would be very likely 
to apply for short-time compensation. Another 30.3 percent said they would be likely to, 
for a total of 83.1 percent who would be either likely or very likely to apply. Only 12.4 
percent said that they would be unlikely or very unlikely to apply for short-time benefits. 
Table 6: Likelihood of Application 
Response Frequency Percent 
Very Unlikely 15 5.2 
Unlikely 21 7.2 
Neither Unlikely nor Likely 13 4.5 
Likely 88 30.3 
Very Likely 153 52.8 
Total 290 100 
 
 However, as shown in Specific Aim 2 and represented in Table 5, workers would 
be more accepting of short-time compensation if the benefits were paid to their 
employers and then included with their weekly pay. While only 17.19 percent said that 
they would be far more accepting of short-time compensation in this arrangement, 35.79 
percent said they would be more accepting, for a total of 52.98 percent saying they would 
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Specific Aim 4 and Sub-aims 4a and 4b 
Does seniority affect the views of short-time compensation? Would senior 
employees prefer layoffs instead? Does union membership affect views? 
 The data thus far have suggested that workers generally support short-time 
compensation and would use it if necessary. However, there are likely several subgroups 
that do not support short-time compensation, such as those who have the most to lose 
from it. Thus, the role that seniority plays in acceptance of short-time compensation was 
analyzed. To study this, the researcher conducted several regression analyses using 
seniority as the independent variable and likelihood of application, comfort of acceptance 
and support within the workplace as dependent variables. 
 However, significance was not found for any of these regressions. Comparing 
seniority and likelihood of application resulted in a weak effect of .041 and a significance 
far beyond the standard .05 level. The analysis of the acceptance of short-time 
compensation was even weaker and less significant, with a correlation of -.032 and a 
significance of p<.05. Support in the workplace had a correlation of .038, but still had a 
significance of more than .05. 
 A similar regression analysis was conducted to analyze the relationship between 
seniority and preference of short-time compensation against layoffs. It had a moderate 
correlation (-.309) and was not significant (.757). Crosstabs showed that this was mostly 
because all levels of seniority supported short-time compensation over layoffs. As Table 
7 shows, approximately 40 percent of respondents preferred short-time compensation to 
layoffs while another 34.57 percent indicated they strongly preferred short-time 
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compensation, for a combined total of 74.72 percent of respondents. The skewed 
distribution of results explains why the regression did not give significant results. 




If your workplace had to reduce worker hours, 


























0 to 19 
percent 
















0.7% 1.5% 0.7% 3.7% 2.6% 9.3% 
Total 5.2% 11.9% 8.2% 40.2% 34.6% 100.0% 
 
 While there was no significance in regards to seniority, there was some 
significance when comparing those that collectively bargain and their support for short-
time compensation. A regression analysis with collective bargaining as the independent 
variable and likelihood of applying for short-time compensation resulted in a significance 
of less than .05 and a correlation of -.119, meaning that those that collectively bargained 
were more likely to apply for short-time compensation benefits. 
 However, other regressions that used collective bargaining status as an 
independent variable were not significant. An analysis comparing bargaining to comfort 
in accepting benefits had a correlation of -.083 and a significance of more than .05 while 
another analysis comparing bargaining and support within the workplace had a 
correlation of .014 and a significance of more than .05. 
  34 
Specific Aim 5 and Sub-aims 5a and 5b 
How do views of short-time compensation differ between industries? Lower-class 
workers favor it at higher levels than upper-class worker workers? Would upper-class 
workers want to use it at all? 
While support for short-time compensation did not differ significantly based on 
seniority or collective bargaining status, it may differ based on the industry of a worker’s 
employment. Thus, an ANOVA was conducted to test how industry might affect the 
likelihood of applying for short-time compensation. Income and Education were included 
in this analysis because of their effect on employment within an industry. To run the test, 
the researcher recoded the Industry variable, consolidating several low-response 
categories. 
However, this test was not significant. Levene’s test only gave a significance of 
more than .05, while the ANOVA listed significance of more than .05 for education, 
income and industry. This suggests that the variables can be treated equally across all 
industries. 
To measure support between lower- and upper-class workers, simple regressions 
were conducted using both education and income variables. These variables were chosen 
for their commonality in measuring social class in other academic literature (Krieger, 
Williams and Moss 1997). These variables were not found to be significant. The only 
significant regression used education as an independent variable and likelihood to apply 
for short-time compensation as the dependent. The analysis found a small, negative 
correlation of -.119 and a significance of less than .05. This means that as workers 
become more educated, they report to be less likely to apply for short-time compensation. 
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Meanwhile, education was also tested as an independent variable and comfort in 
accepting benefits and support within the worker’s place of employment as dependent 
variables (.087 correlation, p<.05; .068 correlation, p<.05, respectively). When running 
regressions using income as the independent variable, the researcher found a correlation 
of -.074 and significance of more than .05 when likelihood of applying for benefits was 
the dependent variable, a correlation of -.074 and a significance of more than .05 when 
comfortableness of accepting benefits was the dependent variable and a correlation of -
.097 and a significance of more than .05 when support for short-time compensation in the 
workplace was the dependent variable. 
 
Specific Aim 6 and Sub-aims 6a, 6b and 6c 
How do views of short-time compensation change depending on political 
ideology? Is there any difference in support from conservatives and liberals? Will each 
group support different potential aspects in a short-time compensation system? Does a 
state’s political climate and ideological leanings affect how people feel about short-time 
compensation? 
Because unemployment and work are often tied into political issues, political 
ideology was used as an independent variable to see how it affected views of short-time 
compensation. This was done through a series of regressions and ANOVA tests. 
Notably, the spectrum of responses on political ideology was fairly balanced in 
this study. Those who identified as extremely liberal or liberal made up 46.2 percent of 
the sample, those that identified as neither liberal nor conservative made up 22.9 percent 
and those who identified as conservative or extremely conservative were the remaining 
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30.8 percent. The survey was set up listing liberal values as low, so negative regressions 
mean that support increases as respondents become more liberal. 
The first step in analyzing political ideology was to run regressions with it as the 
independent variable against likelihood to apply for benefits, comfortableness in 
accepting benefits, and support for short-time compensation within a workplace. All of 
these regressions were statistically significant, as Table 8 shows. The first regression, 
analyzing likelihood to apply showed that for every category a respondent moves towards 
liberal, there is a .163 increase in support for short-time compensation with a significance 
of less than .05. The second, analyzing comfortableness in accepting short-time 
compensation, had a .231 increase in short-time compensation support as a person 
became more liberal with a significance of less than .001. The third main regression, 
looking at support within a workplace, had a correlation of a .186 increase in support as a 
respondent grew more liberal, with a significance less than .01. 
Table 8: Regression Results for Political Ideology and Support Variables 
Variable Unstandardized Coefficient 
Likelihood in Applying for STC -.163* 
Comfortableness in Accepting STC -.231*** 
Support in own Workplace -.186** 
*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001 
 
In terms of determining what aspects in a short-time compensation system would 
be supported based on political ideology, only three aspects were statistically significant. 
Table 9 shows that as a respondent became more liberal, there was a .207 increase in 
support for workers to collectively agree to participate in a short-time compensation 
program (p<.01). Similarly, as workers became more liberal, there was a .126 increase in 
support for the idea that unemployment benefits used during short-time compensation not 
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count against future benefits (p<.05). Nearly all of the other elements were supported by 
liberals more than non-liberals, but not at a statistically significant level. 
Table 9: Regression Results for Political Ideology and Element Variables 
Variable Unstandardized Coefficient 
Workers/Union must collectively agree to short-time 
compensation program -.207** 
STC-using companies must pay more in unemployment 
insurance premiums 
-.112 
STC benefits are paid to employer, who pays them to workers 
through regular paychecks 
-.056 
Employers file for employees' STC benefits -.054 
Workers apply for STC benefits individually -.071 
The government pays STC benefits directly to workers -.066 
Unemployment benefits used through STC do not count against 
future full-time unemployment insurance benefits 
-.126* 
Workers have the option to participate in training programs -.014 
Workers must participate in training programs in lieu of reduced 
hours 
.187** 
*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001 
 
Uniquely, the only element where support grew as a respondent became more 
conservative was the idea that workers must participate in training programs in lieu of 
reduced hours. As a respondent grew more conservative, there was a .187 increase in 
support for this idea (p<.01). 
 As previously stated, the definitions of political ideologies differ between states 
and a conservative in one state may be a moderate in another. Thus, to compare support 
within states, an ANOVA was done using support for short-time compensation within the 
respondents’ workplaces as the dependent variable. 
 Levene’s test gave a significance level of less than .05, making the ANOVA 
significant. Specifically, political ideology is significant (p<.01) but state of employment 
is not (p>.05). Thus, there is no significance between the states and respondents’ political 
ideologies.  
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Comprehensive Analysis 
 Throughout the analysis, the researcher has generally focused on one variable’s 
effect on another variable. The only times where multiple variables were simultaneously 
observed were the few ANOVAs that were conducted. 
 Thus, to best understand what is affecting views and opinions of workers, a series 
of multiple regressions was conducted to see which variables were the most influential in 
respondents’ opinions. To do this, the researcher used education, income, seniority, 
collective bargaining status and political orientation as independents and measured their 
effect on likelihood to apply for short-time compensation, comfortableness in applying 
for short-time compensation, and support for short-time compensation in the workplace. 
 First though, several variables needed to be tested for multicollinearity. Because 
income and education are often highly correlated, they were tested for multicollinearity. 
In running these statistics, the VIF for these variables was approximately 1.000, smaller 
than the 10.000 that would reveal multicollinearity. 
 Table 10 shows the first multiple regression, which measured the variables’ 
effects on likelihood to apply for benefits, had an overall significance of less than .05. 
Being significant, it showed that collective bargaining status and political ideology were 
significant in determining likelihood to apply for short-time compensation (at correlations 
of -.140 and -.175 and significance of p<.05 and p<.01, respectively). 
Table 10: Multiple Regression Results on Likelihood to Apply 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Percentage of coworkers respondent has seniority over. .064 
Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreement -.140* 
Approximate household income .017 
Political Ideology -.175** 
Highest Level of Education -.116 
*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001 
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The second multiple regression, shown in Table 11, which tracked comfort in 
applying for benefits, was also significant with an overall significance of less than .01. 
However, the only item within the model that was significant was political ideology, with 
a correlation of -.223 and a significance of less than .01. 
Table 11: Multiple Regression Results on Comfort in Acceptance 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Percentage of coworkers respondent has seniority over. -.011 
Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreement -.105 
Approximate household income .019 
Political Ideology -.223** 
Highest Level of Education -.083 
*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001 
 
 Table 12 shows that the third and final multiple regression, which showed the 
effects on respondents’ support to short-time compensation at work, was not significant 
with a significance of more than .05. The only significant element within the model was 
political ideology, with a correlation of -.166 and a significance of less than .05. This is 
irrelevant because of the overall significance of the regression. 
Table 12: Multiple Regression Results on Support STC Use in the Workplace 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Percentage of coworkers respondent has seniority over. -.010 
Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreement .025 
Approximate household income -.044 
Political Ideology -.166* 
Highest Level of Education -.033 
*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001 
 
Using all of these data, worker opinions on short-time compensation become 
known. However, based on the previous research that others have done on governmental 
and business needs and actions in regards to short-time compensation, some of their 
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arguments are correlated with the needs and desires of workers. The next section will 
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DISCUSSION 
 If this research shows one thing, it is that American workers are very supportive 
of short-time compensation. The various frequencies conducted showed that Americans 
are generally supportive of short-time compensation. A majority of Midwestern workers 
would be either likely or very likely to apply for benefits and a similar majority would be 
comfortable or very comfortable in accepting them. More senior employees even 
supported short-time compensation. Those with higher household incomes, who would 
maybe be more senior or more vital to a business or would be able to stomach a loss of 
income, also supported short-time compensation. 
 However, there is still some evidence that workers would be wary about their 
situations. For example, a plurality of workers would accept a maximum reduction of 
hours between 11 and 20 hours while approximately a fourth would support a reduction 
of hours only if it was less than 10 percent of their total hours. To some extent, this can 
possibly be explained by survey participants thinking back to the example given in the 
survey in which workers had their hours cut by 20 percent. However, workers are 
generally worried about losing too much time. Is consistent with the finding that many 
workers indicated that they would look for either a supplemental part time job or an 
entirely new full-time job. 
 Furthermore, when asked about various elements of a potential short-time 
compensation system, workers indicated that they would be more accepting of short-time 
compensation if they could collectively agree to participate with other workers and if the 
government provided short-time compensation money directly to workers, and not route 
them through employers like some European countries. One of the higher-scoring aspects 
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was the preference that short-time compensation benefits would not count against future 
unemployment benefits. Another highly scoring element was that workers had the option 
for additional training when on short-time compensation. 
 In essence, these findings suggest two possible outcomes: that workers are less 
likely to trust their employers if part of a short-time compensation agreement and they are 
likely to want a backup plan. By saying that they would look for new jobs and desire 
training, workers are essentially arguing that the do not trust that they will be able to keep 
their jobs and want a backup plan in the form of either a new job or experience that could 
help them get a new job. They also are saying they don’t trust their employer to make 
good decisions, hence the desire to collectively agree to short-time compensation and the 
desire to have their short-time benefits paid directly to them. This is presumably because 
workers feel that they cannot trust their employers after their employers made poor 
decisions that required the use of short-time compensation. This can be seen in the desire 
to have short-time benefits count separately from regular unemployment benefits; 
workers do not trust their employers to be able to keep them employed after the short-
time agreement ends. The relationship between worker and employer in a short-time 
compensation agreement, specifically the role of worker trust, is something that should be 
focused on in future research. 
 The fact that seniority was not significant in any of the regressions indicates that 
senior workers are likely somewhat afraid of being laid off. If they felt that their jobs 
were safe, they would have been more supportive of layoffs, which would generally be 
the more self-interested option of the two. This is something that could be investigated 
further, because fear of layoffs likely plays into support of short-time compensation. 
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Similarly, the lack of significance among higher educated workers and higher paid 
workers may also indicate fears of losing their jobs or a lack of job security. 
 The two areas where there were some significance was when collective 
bargaining status was compared against reported likelihood to apply. Those that 
collectively bargain are more likely to apply for benefits. This may be because of a faith 
in or an allegiance to their unions, who would likely negotiate the terms of the short-time 
compensation agreement. Conversely, more educated individuals may be less likely to 
apply for short-time benefits. This may be because of lessened fears of a layoff, but could 
also be because of an expectation that they have the skills and experience that would get 
them another job if they lost theirs. Alternatively, pride could also be a factor that 
prevents them from being likely to apply for benefits or the knowledge of their 
employers’ inner-workings that would allow them to predict how long a downturn would 
last. 
 The most conclusive findings of this research were in regards to political ideology 
and attitudes towards short-time compensation. Political ideology was statistically 
significant in regards to likelihood to apply for short-time benefits, comfort in accepting 
short-time benefits and accepting the policy in the workplace. The more liberal workers 
are, the more likely they are to support or favor these things. There was also significance 
in making employees agree to a short-time compensation agreement and having benefits 
not count against future unemployment benefits. Again, for these elements, the more 
liberal a person was, the more likely they were to support these elements. 
This supports Vroman’s (2013) findings that showed that short-time 
compensation was more likely to be adopted in liberal leaning states. Today, short-time 
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compensation is still more likely to be supported by those who lean liberal. Thus, it may 
not be surprising that the growth of short-time compensation was partially the result of a 
push by a Democratic Senator in a Democratic-controlled legislature during a Democratic 
presidency. 
In regards to political ideology, though, the most interesting item is the statistical 
significance for support in mandatory training. The more conservative a person is, the 
more likely they are to support mandatory training in lieu of work for short-time benefits. 
This is particularly interesting because that option was the aspect that had the lowest 
support among potential aspects of a system and was the only one where the mean 
suggested that people would be less supportive of a short-time compensation system if 
that was a part of it. 
The conservative support for mandatory training is something that should likely 
be followed up in future research. Why are conservatives more likely to support 
mandatory training? Do they feel like people should be doing something productive if 
they are receiving governmental money? Do they view short-time compensation as an 
unearned entitlement? 
While this research shed some light into the thoughts of workers in regards to 
short-time compensation, it also generates more questions as to why they have those 
opinions and beliefs. Hopefully, these data can serve as a base for future research in the 
area of short-time compensation. 
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STUDY LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 There were some limitations to this research. Due to the use of an online survey, 
there are some concerns about sampling error and participant reliability. As previously 
mentioned, the Amazon MTurk system is generally representative and precautions were 
instituted to filter out unreliable data. However, there are several other larger issues that 
may affect results. 
 Notably, Illinois passed short-time compensation in its November 2014 veto 
session and has signed into law by governor Pat Quinn. Though the law passed 
unanimously in both chambers and was written in a manner that meant it could go into 
effect immediately, the government structures that operate the short-time compensation 
system have not agreed to any short-time agreements. The U.S. Department of Labor 
does not consider Illinois to be a work-sharing state (U.S. Department of Labor 2015). 
Therefore, the law passed in Illinois should not affect the survey’s results in terms of 
worker experience and would only have a moderate effect on a respondent’s knowledge 
of short-time compensation. 
 In addition, the researcher is generally in favor of short-time compensation. As a 
result, some of his bias may be prevalent in the survey or the examination of its findings, 
especially since he developed all of his questions by himself. However, he has developed 
skills that will assist him in keeping objective. His thesis committee has ensured that the 
survey and statistical interpretations stay objective and without favor or opposition to the 
topic being studied. 
 Respondents were asked their political ideology and these data were used in the 
analysis of short-time compensation. However, political ideology is a variable that has a 
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multitude of dimensions. This may cause some discrepancy in the reporting of ideology. 
For example, a participant may be economically liberal or moderate, but identifies as a 
conservative because of a conservative attitude on social issues. As a result, this question 
only measures very basic political attitudes. Future studies in this area should address this 
issue by asking about opinions on several other issues (such as support for unemployment 
compensation, welfare and taxes) and use the answers from these questions in 
combination with a political ideology question to better quantify political ideology.   
 Because future research will build off of this research, some of these limitations 
can be addressed. Additional knowledge of Amazon MTurk can ensure that the sample is 
of higher quality. Furthermore, because research has already been conducted on this 
topic, it may be easier to obtain external funding that would pay for more traditional 
survey methods that are phone-based or possibly interview-based. 
 As time goes on, it is to be expected that more states will pass short-time 
compensation. Thus, comparisons between states that have it and do not have it will be 
more difficult to conduct. However, by becoming more common, research can be 
retailored to ask if participants have heard of short-time compensation, if they have used 
it, or if they approve of their state’s implementation of it. Participant knowledge of short-
time compensation can become a metric by which its success can be measured. 
Presumably, if workers know of short-time compensation, then states and short-time 
compensation advocates are at least successful on informative front. 
 As short-time compensation becomes more common, standardized questionnaires 
will be developed to ask about it. This will make surveying about short-time 
compensation more reliable. Furthermore, if future research focuses on the areas listed in 
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the discussion section, then studies will bridge towards more established areas where 
standardized questions are more common. Ultimately, future data will be more reliable 
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CONCLUSION 
 Short-time compensation assisted numerous countries in their economic 
recoveries around the world. If it had been more common and used more frequently in the 
United States, it is possible the U.S. could have avoided some economic difficulties 
during the recession and the following recovery and could have a stronger economy 
today. Notably, laws are being implemented to ensure that the U.S. will not make the 
same mistakes should the economy come crashing down again. 
 If that were to happen, or even if small downturns happen, Midwestern workers, 
and likely American workers overall are ready to use short-time compensation to their 
benefit. As this research shows, they would trust short-time compensation and support it 
even more if various elements were included with it. Simultaneously, this research 
theorizes that Midwestern workers would be skeptical of their employers’ abilities to 
return to profitability if they needed to turn to short-time compensation. This could likely 
prevent short-time compensation from succeeding in the United States. Depending on 
how short-time compensation systems are crafted, this could also likely lead to the 
downfall of short-time compensation in the United States. 
 To generate short-time compensation success, though, liberals need to convince 
non-liberals of its strength. This will likely need to be done through massive state 
encouragement, similar to that of Rhode Island, and common usage of short-time 
compensation. If short-time compensation could become as commonly known as general 
unemployment benefits, it would likely be able to save many jobs, stimulate the economy 
and help workers feel confident about themselves. In conclusion, these data show that 
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there is potential for these programs in the United States. Employers and the State just 
need to work together to make them successful and beneficial to society.  
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APPENDIX: SAMPLE SURVEY 
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